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Nationalised Large-Scale Mining, Trade Unions and 
Community Representation: Perspectives from Northern 
Madagascar 
Shirley M. Smith and Peter T. Dorward 
School of Agriculture, Policy and Development, The University of Reading, P.O. Box 
217, Reading, Berkshire, RG6 6AH, UK. 
ABSTRACT 
This article critically explores the nature and purpose of relationships and inter-
dependencies between stakeholders in the context of a parastatal chromite mining 
company in the Betsiboka Region of Northern Madagascar.  An examination of the 
institutional arrangements at the interface between the mining company and local 
communities identified power hierarchies and dependencies in the context of a 
dominant paternalistic environment.  The interactions, inter alia, limited social 
cohesion and intensified the fragility and weakness of community representation, 
which was further influenced by ethnic hierarchies between the varied community 
groups; namely, indigenous communities and migrants to the area from different 
ethnic groups.   
Moreover, dependencies and nepotism, which may exist at all institutional levels, 
can create civil society stakeholder representatives who are unrepresentative of the 
society they are intended to represent.  Similarly, a lack of horizontal and vertical 
trust and reciprocity inherent in Malagasy society engenders a culture of low 
expectations regarding transparency and accountability, which further catalyses a 
cycle of nepotism and elite rent-seeking behaviour.  On the other hand, leaders 
retain power with minimal vertical delegation or decentralisation of authority among 
levels of government and limit opportunities to benefit the elite, perpetuating rent-
seeking behaviour within the privileged minority.  Within the union movement, 
pluralism and the associated politicisation of individual unions restricts solidarity, 
which impacts on the movement’s capacity to act as a cohesive body of opinion and 
opposition.  Nevertheless, the unions’ drive to improve their social capital has 
increased expectations of transparency and accountability, resulting in demands for 
greater engagement in decision-making processes.   
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Introduction 
This article contributes to the debate on community development in the extractives 
industries, focusing on the challenges associated with the concept of stakeholder 
engagement in decision-making processes, as required by initiatives, such as the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).  The EITI is an externally validated 
voluntary scheme aiming to nurture “good governance” through improved 
transparency and accountability in countries dependent on revenues from 
extractives industries.1  One key principle is the engagement of a well-informed 
stakeholder group comprising governments, companies and civil society (Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative Secretariat, 2008, Department for International 
Development, 2006).  The underlying question, however, is whether the trend 
towards community engagement in such processes is, in reality, effectively 
contributing to the desired rhetoric of good governance by improving accountability 
and demanding greater transparency?2   
Moreover, the focus on mineral extraction as a vehicle for economic growth in 
resource-rich developing countries is controversial on account of questionable 
economic and poverty alleviation benefits, as well as the direct environmental and 
social impacts.  Notably, reliance on tax revenues from mineral exports is associated 
with conflict, corruption and rent-seeking behaviour – a paradox, known as the 
‘Resource Curse’.3  As a consequence, the World Bank’s ongoing support for mineral 
extraction as a vehicle for socio-economic development has attracted criticism (see 
e.g. Auty 1993; Karl 1997; Pegg 2003).  Nevertheless, many resource-rich developing 
countries have embarked on a strategy of expanding the extractives sector, 
ostensibly to fund economic and social development plans.  Associated mining 
reforms and relatively untapped mineral reserves have catalysed the growth of the 
                                                     
1
 The term ‘good governance’ is subjective and complex to define, although It is typically described in 
terms of the mechanisms considered necessary to achieve a certain quality of governance, such as 
embracing participatory processes as an essential component to improve transparency and 
accountability in the extractive industries (Hobley and Shields 2000; Hyden et al. 2003).   
2
 In developing countries, ‘good governance’ is commonly linked to the concept of participation as an 
essential component of achieving accountability (Hobley and Shields 2000). 
3
 In the context of resource revenues, rent-seeking refers to the impact of natural resources on the 
behaviour of private agents, groups of agents or agencies and the motivation for their actions.  In 
other words, rent-seeking is motivated by the potential financial gain from large resource revenues 
and manifests as economically inefficient decision-making by government officials pursuing self-
interests (Kolstad and Wiig 2009).  
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mining sector in sub-Saharan Africa in particular.  In addition to recent rapid sector 
growth, predominantly through trans-national corporations, Madagascar has a long-
established chromite mine, which provides historical and parastatal perspectives to 
the controversy surrounding the impacts of the extractives industries on community 
development. 
The fieldwork for this research was conducted in Madagascar in June 2009, shortly 
after violent civil unrest had precipitated the resignation of President 
Ravalomanana.4  The circumstances surrounding his downfall included widespread 
concerns about land acquisition for both large-scale mining and agricultural use by 
foreign companies.  For instance, the allocation of 1,300,000 hectares of arable land 
to Daewoo Logistics to produce palm oil and corn for export was considered an 
excess and abuse of power (Vinciguerra 2010; Andrianirina–Ratsialonana et al. 2011; 
IRIN Africa 2012).5  Ravalomanana was accused of ‘selling off’ ancestral land to the 
South Korean company without due regard for informal land ownership, particularly 
untitled unoccupied pastoral lands.  Furthermore, the workforce was to be 
predominantly South African, fuelling concerns about the absence of employment 
opportunities for Malagasy people and equivocal added-value to local communities.  
In 2009, the Daewoo land lease was revoked by the Haute Autorité de la Transition 
(Transitional High Authority: transitional government) (after Pearce 2012).  Although 
President Ravalomanana’s exit marked the end of a seven year period of relative 
political stability, many citizens considered it the rightful deposing of a corrupt 
president.6   
The circumstances surrounding land disputes are reflected in the literature regarding 
the country’s governance systems and processes relating to forest management and 
biodiversity.  Authors have identified imbalances in community representation that 
impact on the equity of access to common pool resources and which diminish 
respect for traditional governance.  For example, often motivated by the 
                                                     
4
 In March 2009, Ravalomanana handed power to a military directorate who immediately passed the 
country’s leadership to Andry Rajoelina, the former Mayor of Antananarivo, and a transitional 
government (Haute Autorité de la Transition: High Transitional Authority) (Ploch 2009).  
5
 The extent of the deal can be more easily contextualised when compared to the area of arable land 
currently exploited: Daewoo were to lease an area equivalent to more than half of the country’s 
estimated 2,500,000 hectare of exploited pastoral land). 
6
 Presidential elections have been repeatedly postponed, although the first round was held on 
October 25th 2103 BBC. (2013). "Madagascar holds long-awaited presidential elections."  Retrieved 
25th October, 2013, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24661607. 
4 
privatisation and commercialisation of natural resources, rural communities are 
excluded from the resources that form the basis of their livelihoods (Ramamonjisoa 
2010).  Furthermore, the powerful influence of external actors in policy-making 
decisions, such as private operators, non-governmental organisations, donors and 
the state, facilitates the exclusion of poor rural communities and the subordination 
of their traditional activities (Huff 2010; Smith et al. 2012).  Poor communication and 
a lack of information from policy-makers and implementers further marginalise the 
poor communities likely to be affected by those policy decisions (Talbot 2010).  In 
essence, community voices are rarely invited to the negotiating table and 
infrequently heard in policy debates on conservation governance in Madagascar 
where, increasingly, the ‘rich’ have the power to marginalise the ‘poor’s’ access to 
resources (after Beck and Nesmith 2001).   
This paper aims to explore the validity and authority of community representatives 
selected to engage in decision-making processes, particularly in light of the growing 
global trend for community stakeholder engagement as a means of strengthening 
governance.  For instance, a key principle of the EITI is the engagement of a broad 
stakeholder group – comprising governments, companies and civil society - with the 
aim of achieving greater transparency and accountability (Department for 
International Development 2006; Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
Secretariat 2008).  The paper commences with an overview of mineral code reforms 
and an outline of large-scale mining in Madagascar to introduce the case study 
company and the union movement therein.  Within the context of resource-rich 
developing countries experiencing political instability, the findings of the data 
analysis contextualise the challenges of community representation and the 
implications of using stakeholder engagement as a means of improving governance.  
The discussion explores influences within the interactions associated with the 
extractives industries, situating them in the broader literature to offer a global 
perspective on the findings. 
Mining codes and reforms 
The evolution of mining codes in sub-Saharan Africa is associated with the structural 
adjustment and trade liberalisation programmes advocated by the World Bank to 
attract FDI, in the climate of significant debt experienced by many developing 
countries in the 1970s.  Much has been written about the impacts of structural 
adjustment programmes, but very little attention has been paid to the consequent 
trade liberalisation and privatisation of state enterprises, particularly in the mining 
sector.  In effect, these liberalisation policies assume considerable importance, as 
they form the basis of the long-term relationships between resource-rich 
governments and trans-national mining companies.   
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Campbell (2003) notes that three generations of mining codes have developed in 
response to trends in governance and economic structural adjustment.  The first 
generation reflects the World Bank’s liberalisation strategy of privatisation and state 
deregulation of the mining industry.  The accompanying reforms stimulated a mining 
boom; yet, in Ghana, positive impacts were limited at the local and national level, 
due to most foreign exchange earnings being invested, and remaining, offshore.  
Second generation codes emphasise capacity-building and good governance through 
institutional reforms, whilst retaining the earlier concept of state deregulation which 
places responsibilities largely on the private sector.  Nevertheless, second generation 
codes fail to address the statutory control of environmental impacts or the allocation 
of revenues towards sustainable development.  Moreover, the mechanism to effect 
self-regulation was unclear, particularly in a political, social and market environment 
with a weak institutional framework unaccustomed to intense public scrutiny.  
Guinea’s code, for example, initially based on the principle that improved 
environmental management leads to social and economic development, 
subsequently evolved to prioritise economic growth rather than sustainable 
development.  The underlying implication is that any negative impacts of mineral 
exploitation would be tolerated to accommodate economic growth (Campbell 2004).   
This combination of poor public scrutiny, limited state intervention and the pressure 
of competitive markets in the mining sector has been linked to increased poverty, 
which impedes progress towards the goal to achieve sustainable social and economic 
development (Campbell 2004).  Third generation codes aim to address such 
problems by incorporating the engagement of stakeholders in the consultative 
process and reintroducing state regulation.  Although mining codes overtly aim to 
improve governance, the experience of most developing countries suggests that this 
aim is over-shadowed by the drive for FDI.  For instance, in Tanzania, driven by 
external financial pressures during a period of extreme debt, the code  was heavily 
influenced by the objective to establish a risk-free investment climate (Butler 2004).  
Considered to be a third generation code, Madagascar’s Document Cadre de 
Politique Minière (Mining Policy Outline Document) sets out environmental 
legislation to protect the high level of endemic species in the country and formally 
adopts the concept of stakeholder engagement as a means of consultation.  In 
common with Ghana, Guinea and Tanzania, motivated by high external debt and the 
drive for a high growth economy, Madagascar introduced fiscal conditions, including 
low duties and revenue rates, to attract FDI in its growing mineral industry with the 
ostensible goal of poverty reduction and environmental protection.  Sarrasin (2009: 
p. 155) argues that: “It is precisely the consequences of such policies that the EIR 
(Extractive Industries Review) addressed, questioning the effects of liberalisation on 
the legal framework, on poverty and the environment”, noting that the lack of public 
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scrutiny and weak institutional framework, typical of many countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa lowers a government’s capacity to intervene.7  Butler (2004) adds that 
financial dependence on FDI further weakens a government’s opportunity to 
negotiate.  Thus, Madagascar’s heavily indebted economic status and the outcome 
of structural adjustment programmes are likely to leave the government in a weak 
position with regard to negotiating with external investors, such as Rio Tinto and 
Sherritt.8  Despite these criticisms, the World Bank continues to drive liberalisation 
and privatisation.  Based on models established in Latin America, the Bank provides 
loans, guidance and expertise to countries embarking on legal, fiscal and regulatory 
reform in their extractives sector (Butler 2004).   
Madagascar is a recipient of ongoing World Bank loans to finance regulatory and 
governance reform in the mineral sector (see World Bank 1998; 2002; 2003; 2008).  
The country’s trans-national large-scale mining industry is relatively new, thus, 
studies are yet to examine its impact on the local economy.  However, experience 
from the aforementioned ill-fated Daewoo land deal suggests that improving social 
conditions through developing local employment opportunities was not integral to 
the then-Government’s agenda for attracting FDI.  The country’s rapid mineral 
industry growth supported by World Bank loans aimed at attracting FDI combined 
with the statutory disempowerment observed in other developing countries provide 
further reasons for conducting this study in Madagascar. 
Large-scale chromite mining in Madagascar 
The location for this study is the country’s first chromium mine, which was opened at 
Bemanevika in 1968 by Compagnie Minière d'Andriamena (COMINA); a joint venture 
between the French group (PUK: Pichiney Ugine Kullman) with 20 per cent 
Government of Madagascar ownership.  In 1975, during the socialist period in 
Madagascar’s political history, COMINA was nationalised and the name changed to 
Kraomita Malagasy S.A. or Kraoma as it is commonly known and referred to 
hereafter.  The company’s website cites Kraoma as a limited company belonging 
entirely to the state, with an authorised capital of 3,231,560,000 MGA (US$ 1.4 
                                                     
7
 In response to criticism of its support for mineral extraction, the World Bank commissioned the 
Extractive Industries Review (EIR), which is also critical and recommends that the Bank requires 
countries to meet specific criteria before providing financial support to extractive projects (World 
Bank 2004). 
8
 Rio Tinto and Sherritt projects were the most advanced at the time of this study. 
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million),9 although it ambiguously also states that “the State owns the majority of 
shares in the company” (Kraomita Malagasy S.A. 2010).10  Madagascar’s EITI report 
for 2011 clarifies that the company is a 75:25 public-private partnership between the 
Ministère de l’Energie et des Mines (Ministry of Energy and Mines) and two financial 
partners, SONAPAR and Ny Havana (2007; Ernst & Young 2011: p. 10).11   
Kraoma operates in Betsiboka Region, which is rich in exploitable minerals, notably 
gold, gypsum and chromium.  Artisanal gold mining has occurred for decades in 
Maevatanana District within Betsiboka.  Gemstones and semi-precious stones occur 
in the south of the Region; however, very little information is published regarding 
their exploitation potential (Région Betsiboka undated).  The communes of Briéville 
and Andriamena, Kraoma’s area of operation, are logistically isolated from Betsiboka 
Region’s administrative centre, Maevatanana, by the limited road infrastructure and 
geographically separated by the Tsaratanana Massif, which contains the highest 
mountains in the country.  Antananarivo, the country’s capital, approximately 400 
kilometres south of Briéville is more accessible than the regional centre.  The 
cosmopolitan mix of Malagasy ethnicities around Andriamena/Briéville has remained 
relatively constant since the French-established mining company was nationalised in 
the 1970s.  Communities evolved around mineral exploitation; both the large-scale 
chromite exploitation and artisanal gold mining attracted in-migrants from across 
Madagascar, expanding both rural and urban communities.  Briéville is one of the 
largest communes in the Region, with a population of 14000 (Cornell University 
2002).  Briéville town has approximately 3500 residents – all Malagasy except for one 
expatriate - of whom 350 are directly employed by Kraoma.12   
                                                     
9
 Ostermiller, S. (2013, 5th October 2013). "Calculator for United States Dollar." Currency Exchange 
Rate Conversion  Retrieved October 5th, 2013, from http://coinmill.com/MGA_calculator.html. 
10
“L'État possède donc la majorité des actions de la société” – translated by the author. 
11
 SONAPAR: Société Nationale de Participation Et De Placements, an official investment agency.  NY 
HAVANA Assurances & Reassurances Sobika. (2011). "Ny Havana." Guide Services  Retrieved 1st 
October 2011, 2011, from http://www.sobika.com/sofitrans-nyhavana.html. 
12
  Madagascar is administratively divided into Regions, Districts, Communes and Fokontany; the latter 
being the lowest level, roughly comparable to a parish in the UK.  In this article, a distinction is made 
between Briéville town and Briéville commune.  Briéville town refers to the urban centre; Briéville 
commune refers to the administrative area comprising the town and rural fokontany. 
8 
Union movement in Madagascar 
The union movement is active in Kraoma, with six of the country’s 13 unions 
represented there.  Unions were initially established in Madagascar in the late 1930s 
by French colonialists, to support workers in the colony’s developing agriculture and 
export sectors.  Affiliation evolved around Christian, Socialist and Communist 
themes, similar to the French union structure at the time (Andrianasy and Groeger 
2011).  Prior to this, membership in French unions worldwide had been exclusively 
for Europeans (Bureau for Workers' Activities of ILO (ACTRAV-ILO) 2010).   
In 1960, after Madagascar’s independence, the union movement was granted legal 
status by the new Republic (2005: p. 204-205).  However, during the Second Republic 
- from 1975 to the end of President Ratsiraka’s first term in 1992 - unions 
experienced significant change, essentially being incorporated into the political 
system and having to align themselves with the socialist government.13  Exacerbated 
by the impact of economic liberalisation ushered in by structural adjustment policies, 
unions struggled to survive during this period and their membership declined 
considerably.  In the 1990s, during the political liberalisation of the Third Republic, 
the union movement regained its independence (Andrianasy and Groeger 2011).  
Although several new unions were created and surviving unions regained their 
authority, the union movement’s power and strength remain diminished and 
membership has not returned to pre-socialist era levels.  Several authors have 
commented on the weakness of the union movement in Madagascar in the 21st 
century, citing factors such as proliferation; poor internal organisation; difficulties in 
accessing the strong informal sector; and the unlawful obstruction of trade union 
activities in certain economic areas, such as the free trade zones and informal sector 
(2005; Fleischmann 2009; ITUC 2008).  Unions have also accused the Ministère de la 
Fonction Publique, du Travail et des Lois Sociales (Ministry of Public Service, Labour 
and Social Law) of contributing to their disempowerment by selecting candidates for, 
and manipulating the outcome of, the elections for worker representatives to 
various tripartite bodies (ITUC 2008).  However, few authors have explored the role 
and function of trade unions in the extractives industries in terms of their 
engagement and capacity to influence decision-making processes, as well as their 
potential role in stakeholder groups. 
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 Admiral Didier Ratsiraka initially gained presidential control as part of an interim military junta in 
1975, retaining his position through two elections until losing to Albert Zafy in 1993, whom he 
subsequently defeated to regain the presidency in 1997.  
9 
Highlighting the volatile political context at the time of the study, the introduction to 
this article aims to establish several key points: the challenges associated with 
community representation; the drivers for resource-rich developing countries to 
attract FDI, specifically in terms of mineral exploitation; the global emphasis on 
stakeholder engagement as a means of improving governance mechanisms; and the 
under-explored potential role of the union movement.   
Methodology 
The purpose of this study was to critically examine and explore relationships and 
interactions between the varied stakeholders at the grassroots, to test the thesis of 
engaging civil society as a means of achieving accountability and transparency in the 
pursuance of good governance in the extractives industries.  The study explored the 
institutional and governance relationships between large-scale mining companies, 
government and local communities.  Emphasis was placed on the social 
consequences and benefits to host communities associated with decision-making 
during the initial phases of the mining business cycle through to operational 
activities.   
The research was structured to consider the interactions between social actors and 
their inherent impact or capacity to change social phenomena.  Social constructivism 
forms the ontological basis for the study with an interpretive epistemological 
approach.  Interviews were the preferred method of data collection as they facilitate 
the collection of peoples’ experiences, thus, providing a more personal 
understanding of historical, current and future concerns.  They also offer an 
opportunity to clarify and expand on answers through further questioning.  The data 
analysis is based on the values and significance people place on their own and 
others’ actions within social interfaces (after Grix 2002; Robson 2002).   
The data mostly originate from 30 interviews and four focus groups conducted, in 
2009, in the communes intrinsically linked to the government-owned, but privately 
managed mining company, Kraoma.  However, 26 interviews with 32 key informants 
had previously been conducted in Antananarivo, the country’s capital, to gain 
strategic policy data.14  Rural communities were purposively selected using the 
criteria of villages currently economically dependent on Briéville commune, although 
it should be noted that this did not exclude any of the neighbouring communities.  
Interviews were conducted with the assistance of a native Malagasy interpreter 
                                                     
14
 Some interviews were conducted with more than one respondent. 
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fluent in the local dialect; all interviews were recorded and then fully transcribed.  
The interviews were conducted to enable a discourse flow from respondents amidst 
the active translations necessary to ensure all parties properly understood the 
ongoing dialogue.   
The mining project is the only large-scale employer in the location; thus, the level of 
risk posed to respondents participating in the study was assessed prior to interview.  
The study objectives respected the rights of respondents in terms of their 
relationship with other stakeholders (after Kent et al. 2002).  However, very few 
respondents expressed concern about discussing controversial or sensitive issues, 
possibly on account of the anonymity offered and the climate of openness which 
accompanied the presidential coup.  Pre-interview discussions were held with the 
mining company and key rural figures to explain the aims and objectives of the 
research, and to confirm confidentiality of response, thus, respecting hierarchical 
structures of permission in Malagasy society.   
The breadth of potential stakeholders in this location is constrained.  Few small and 
medium businesses exist around Briéville, only one non-governmental organisation 
is active and no regional government departments are present.  Notably, the ethnic 
diversity within the community is higher than in most locations in the rest of the 
country.  Community respondents were selected from a heterogeneous social group 
spanning a range of social classes and ethnicities.  The ages of these people ranged 
from early-20s to early-80s and included small retailers, teachers, religious leaders, 
farmers and a traditional leader, as well as a mayor and several présidents fokontany 
or vice-présidents fokontany (elected representatives of unique administrative areas 
and their deputies).15  A number of women were purposively selected for interviews 
in the retail sector and community respondents.  Women freely participated in 
mixed sex focus groups; thus, single-sex focus groups were not conducted.  Women 
have a comparatively equitable status in many central highlands tribes – a case in 
point being that, pre-colonisation, a queen often headed Merina royalty (Graeber 
2007). 16  
Data were analysed using both coding and non-coding methods.  Codes originating 
from the initial research questions were manually applied to transcripts, and then 
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 Constitutionally, mayors, présidents fokontany and their deputies are elected by universal suffrage. 
16
 The Merina tribe, concentrated in the Central Highlands around Antananarivo, politically dominated 
the island prior to colonisation by the French. 
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interrogated and sorted to identify themes.  To broaden the analysis capacity and to 
maximise the flexibility of the qualitative data, a non-coded iterative process of 
interview transcript review was also undertaken.  Themes identified in each 
transcript were subsequently collated and summarised within and across each 
stakeholder group to determine the key patterns.   
Findings 
To explore the challenges of community representation and the implications of using 
stakeholder engagement as a means of improving governance in resource-rich 
developing countries experiencing political instability, the findings contextualise the 
relationships between the varied stakeholders.  They are presented under the 
following themes:  1) social context and employment profile in the location; 2) 
relationships between Kraoma and the wider community; 3) community 
representation; and 4) key players and institutions in a business context.  
Social context and employment profile 
Exploring the social profile in the location provides an insight into communities, their 
institutions and representatives, issues which are critical to the identification of key 
players and institutional arrangements at the interface between mining and society.  
Prior to the development of commercial chromite mining in the 1960s (as outlined in 
the Introduction), the area comprised indigenous communities and established 
groups of Malagasy in-migrants attracted to the plentiful uncultivated agricultural 
land and artisanal mining activities.  As the large-scale mining operation developed, 
in-migration increased.  Rural in-migrant respondents described the various 
motivations for their families’ move to Briéville and Andriamena: to engage in the 
artisanal gem and gold exploitation, which has continued to grow since the 1940s; to 
find a sustainable livelihood through good agricultural land outside their homeland 
in under-populated rural grasslands; or the desire to make a living supplying produce 
to the flourishing new mining community.  As one elderly villager explained during 
an interview:  
I arrived here in 1942...  There was no company at that time.  People were 
just looking for gold and then precious stones: crystal and amethyst.  People 
did nothing other than grinding rice to be sold in Morarano (neighbouring 
commune]…  Men and women walked a long way – for three days - carrying 
12 
the rice and they only got 10 FMG [2 MGA] for five boxes [70 kilograms]17 
(Briéville, June 2009). 
Older rural respondents spoke about the gradual evolution of employment 
opportunities over time, from manual work through to semi-skilled labour.  During 
an interview, an elderly ‘newcomer’,18 who had moved to the area prior to the 
establishment of commercial chromite extraction, summarised the evolution of 
employment opportunities from the start of the construction phase in the 1960s:  
Kraoma [at the time of COMINA ownership] invited people to come and work 
[for them].  Because people had little education, they got manual work and 
labouring. Quite a lot of people [got jobs] because it included road building 
[and they needed lots].  Some of them worked until retirement.  [Once the 
road was built] some of those people with a little education worked for 
Kraoma, but manual jobs.  They started to learn new things...  Some of them 
became mechanics or drivers (Briéville, June 2009).  
However, this study found that the majority of Kraoma’s employees were recruited 
from the urban community, who are predominantly “newcomers”.  Each rural 
fokontany (parish) visited during the study reported only two or three men 
employed by Kraoma and a similar number who had retired and returned to the 
village to resume farming activities on family land.19  Even with the appropriate 
educational qualifications, recruitment practices seemed to discriminate against 
rural men.20  One suitably qualified rural respondent cited nepotism as a factor in his 
difficulty in gaining employment.  A respondent closely linked to Kraoma confirmed 
that urban children of workers received preferential treatment, although “not every 
son gets a job” (Briéville, June 2009).  A rural male would be unlikely to be employed 
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 10 FMG (Malagasy Franc - currency pre-1961, although still commonly referred to in conversation) = 
2 MGA, (Malagasy Ariary – current currency) which is equivalent to 1/10
th
 of a US cent.  Rice is 
commonly measured in boxes: 1 box = approximately 14 kilograms. 
18
 Settled families refer to themselves as ‘newcomers’, regardless of the date of their arrival; the most 
established ‘newcomer’ respondent arrived as a small child in 1942. 
19
 Employees from rural villages generally moved to town with their children in order to benefit from 
Kraoma’s housing, education and welfare facilities, often returning to the villages at weekends to 
farm family land or, in some cases, to visit second wives.   
20
The minimum standard is BEPC: (Brevet d'Études du Premier Cycle) a French educational 
qualification (although no longer used in France), which most closely equates to GCSEs (General 
Certificate of Secondary Education) in the UK. 
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unless his father had retired from Kraoma.  These discriminatory employment 
practices resulted in departments recruiting from the same fokon’olo (kinship group) 
in the urban community.21  Thus, ethnic grouping and hierarchies were observed in 
the employment profile.   
Kraoma employs very few females in Briéville town; thus, formal employment 
opportunities for women are limited.  A small number of women worked in the 
government health clinic or as teachers at either urban or rural government schools.  
Females, however, dominated the small retail sector, working in the pharmacy as 
well as self-employed in small shops and stalls in the market.  One key respondent 
estimated that approximately 30 women had formal salaried employment in 
Briéville: less than one per cent of the town’s population.  As a consequence, the 
majority of women in town were unemployed, bored and lacked motivation.  In 
2007, in an attempt to rebalance the poor social skills exhibited by women in 
Briéville town, a women’s association was established by a few middle class women 
associated with Kraoma.  Social problems manifested as arguments escalating into 
physical fights between women and a degree of child neglect.  The low educational 
level of female community members, compared with mining communities in other 
countries, and poor motivation due to a lack of job opportunities were thought to be 
causal factors, exacerbated by some stereotypical male behaviour: polygamy, 
alcohol abuse and failure to provide wives with money.  Initial meetings focused on 
basic social skills; dressmaking and cooking were also offered, in an attempt to 
expand livelihood potential.  Those sharing their skills, however, struggled to balance 
the wider benefits of altruism against their direct loss of earnings.  In common with 
several associations encountered in this study, members’ enthusiasm waned on 
realisation that they had to actively participate in the association rather than 
passively benefit from other people’s actions.  Membership had halved by 2009 and, 
despite verbal support for the initiative and (broken) promises of lambahoany 
(traditional sarongs), Kraoma provided no funding for the association.   
Relationships between Kraoma and the wider community 
In a broader context, the company’s economic and political capital has facilitated the 
evolution of a paternalistic relationship with both rural and urban communities.22  
Kraoma is the only large employer in Briéville commune and provides the majority of 
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 In the context of multi-cultural Briéville, fokon’olo refers to people with shared ethnicity or kinship.   
22
 In this context, paternalism is used to describe the hierarchical relationships that have developed 
between the company, its workers and neighbouring communities. 
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housing, services, utilities and schools in the town.  It assisted with the construction 
of four churches and a new classroom at the public high school, as well as funding 
the Alliance Française (French cultural centre).  A senior manager in Kraoma 
summarised the relationship between Kraoma and wider society during an interview:  
In Briéville, Kraoma is in charge of everything, including medical care.23  The 
houses belong to Kraoma; the Catholic and Protestant churches were built by 
Kraoma…  We run kindergarten, primary and junior high schools.  ...[there is 
a] tight interdependence and interaction between society and [the 
company]...  This town exists because of Kraoma.  Most, maybe 95 per cent, 
live on activities linked to Kraoma.  It is a very cosmopolitan town; all the 
tribes in Madagascar are represented here.  [Note: Only one expatriate 
resident in town.]  They came here to work.  ...it makes Briéville unique 
compared to other cities.  Also the company pays royalty taxes... that are 
used for things like building the new market.  Even the neighbouring 
communities depend on Kraoma.  Local peasants provide produce etc. to sell 
to Kraoma and its employees.  ...Kraoma also provides the light, electricity 
and water (Briéville, June 2009).  
Kraoma’s Service Cité (maintenance department) extended beyond responsibility for 
employees’ housing, operating as a profit-making business.  In the absence of any 
private maintenance or service companies in town, Service Cité would work on non-
Kraoma property and invoice the owner.  It was unclear whether Kraoma had 
adopted a strategy to exclude private ventures, or had been compelled to fill a gap in 
the market on account of the general lack of skills and initiative within the 
community.  
Although Kraoma does not have a formal corporate social responsibility programme 
extending beyond the welfare of employees, exploration and observation of the 
relationships between Kraoma and the community in the company’s catchment area 
identified clear paternalistic tendencies.  When asked about Kraoma’s development 
activities in the area, a senior manager offered examples of infrastructure 
improvements and pastoral care:  
We made the road, firstly for our benefit, but Briéville commune also profits.  
The Alliance Française [which Kraoma funds] - everyone can go there to 
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 Kraoma provides healthcare for employee families; however, a state health clinic provides primary 
care for non-employees. 
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improve their communication skills.  Kraoma has a clinic and everyone can 
have a consultation there.  Everything isn’t free, sometimes you have to pay 
for medicines, but everyone can benefit.  In addition, the company 
ambulance can be used to transport people to the hospital at 
Ambatondrazaka.  There are also HIV testing facilities at the clinic 
(Antananarivo, June 2009). 
Arguably, the in-migration of farmers to the area since the 1960s indicates the 
perceived positive impact of Kraoma on rural livelihoods.24  Farmers were attracted 
to the availability of non-cultivated land and the expanding urban market of Briéville 
residents.  Many expounded the opportunity to settle and invest in land, although 
land ownership for some ‘newcomers’ is contentious.25  Indigenous farmers also 
benefitted, increasing their yield to sell produce to the urban community.   
In an urban setting, however, greater criticism was directed at Kraoma and their 
dominance over both local government and the wider community, particularly with 
regard to their influence in decision-making processes.  Unequivocally, Kraoma is the 
most powerful actor in Briéville commune.  Despite being a public-private 
partnership, the company is considered state-owned, which affords it considerable 
control over strategic decision-making processes, essentially subordinating local and, 
the mostly absent, regional government.  Moreover, Kraoma’s payment of royalties 
to the commune has enabled urban Briéville to develop beyond similar sized 
communes elsewhere and has led to local government dependency on Kraoma.  
From a broader perspective, Kraoma’s presence is also the catalyst for the area’s 
development; however, no significant regional or national government development 
programmes were identified in the commune.   
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 The company was established in the 1960s. 
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 The Government’s policy of formalising land ownership had created conflict between indigenous 
communities and ‘newcomers’ in the area.  Some ‘newcomer’ communities had encountered 
difficulties registering land ownership, despite having occupied and farmed land for over 40 years.  In 
an interview, a ‘newcomer’ who arrived in the mid 1970s explained the source of the disharmony: 
“Land that was obviously not being used – ‘newcomers’ started to exploit it, then afterwards 
(indigenous) people claimed it” (Briéville, June 2009).   
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Community representation: local government, traditional governance and ethnic 
associations 
Local government elections in Madagascar are tainted with irregularities and political 
manipulation, which create hierarchies of dependency and the effective suppression 
of opposition (Smith et al. 2012).  Within the local government hierarchy, the Chef de 
Région (Regional Head: the government representative at regional level) is the key 
actor.26  Constitutionally, local government officials are elected posts; however, if 
elections are held, they are routinely ‘stage-managed’.  Mayoral elections in Briéville 
and Andriamena communes had been controversial, attracting accusations of 
candidate list manipulation.27  Several respondents accused the Chef de Région and 
Chef de District (Regional and District Heads) of bullying rural communities into 
voting for the ‘preferred’ candidate, to ensure the political homogeneity of post-
holders.  The relationship between Kraoma and Briéville’s Mayor was described as 
close.  One respondent succinctly remarked in an interview: “The Mayor doesn’t 
work for Kraoma, but it makes no difference.  You don’t have to work for Kraoma to 
be influenced by their power” (Briéville, June 2009).  Conversely, présidents 
fokontany elections were generally considered fair, although vice-présidents 
fokontany were politically appointed in certain locations.28  Notably, this political 
manipulation of government officials creates dependencies which manifest as an 
unwillingness or incapacity to address non-compliance or the ineffectiveness of 
others within the cycle of dependency, resulting in a culture with low expectations of 
individual accountability.  With specific relevance to the subject of stakeholder 
engagement in good governance initiatives, this can manifest as the suppression of 
community voices with regard to opposing and expressing concerns about the 
influence of the mining company or local government strategy.   
Furthermore, the sanctity and autonomy of traditional governance in Madagascar 
are visibly diminishing under the influence of external governance and 
modernisation in resource-rich locations (Smith et al. 2012).  In Briéville commune, 
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 Since their establishment in 2004, no elections have been held for any Chef de Région in the 
country; individuals have been appointed by the President according to political alliance and personal 
preference.   
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 The Mayors of Briéville and Andriamena communes, like many others, had overtly supported and 
been supported by Ravalomanana’s political party, Tiako I Madagaskara (TIM) - Malagasy for “I love 
Madagascar”, in the elections in 2007. 
28
 Présidents and vice-présidents fokontany are elected representatives of unique administrative areas 
known as fokontany (parishes).   
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however, traditional governance has evolved an almost unique context.  In the early 
stages of urban expansion, ethnic groups with sizeable communities acted positively 
to strengthen their identity by establishing associations to aid with the protection of 
cultural norms, particularly those associated with death or marriage.29  The 
associations’ roles had evolved into intervening in family disputes within the same 
ethnic group and mediating in disputes between different tribes.  Although the 
associations were mostly described in the context of funerals, in effect, they had 
vicariously assumed the responsibilities of traditional elders.  Several associations 
had appointed an elder, although his role was considered more a contribution to 
moral well-being than traditional governance.  In summary, although ethnic 
associations exhibited considerable internal solidarity and the capacity to enhance 
social capital through unifying fokon’olo (kinship groups), they had few horizontal or 
vertical linkages and their political capital was minimal beyond kinship boundaries.   
Traditional governance was more overtly recognised in the rural indigenous 
community visited in Andriamena; more remote from Briéville and, thus, diminished 
Kraoma’s influence.  The Tangalamena’s (traditional and cultural leader) advice was 
sought regarding auspicious dates for important events, such as rice planting and 
marriages.30  One Tangalamena expressed serious concern about secession, citing 
the younger generation’s limited exposure to events similar to those which acted as 
a catalyst in developing his inherent gift, compounded by diminishing interest in 
traditional culture.  The testimony of this Tangalamena (traditional and religious 
leader) revealed a decline in the social and political capital of traditional governance.  
Certain traditions, however, remained steadfast.  For instance, Kraoma 
acknowledged the significance of customary land blessings for new ventures by 
inviting the Tangalamena to conduct a traditional blessing ceremony at a newly 
opened mine.  Although traditional institutions were stronger in the indigenous 
communities, their strength was gradually diminishing due to a variety of factors, 
including modernisation.  Moreover, the mechanism whereby traditional leaders 
achieve their position on the basis of age and family links has created a deep-rooted 
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 Return to homeland and reconnection with ancestors is very important to Malagasy people after 
death; thus, the association helped fokon’olo (kinship group) members regain their spiritual home.   
30 Tangalamena represent the tribe’s royalty at a local level; their authority is bestowed on them at a 
fokon’olona, if they are judged to have the appropriate skills and experience.  The ability to 
communicate with ancestors is essential, royal lineage is not.  Literally, Tangalamena translates as 
‘red stick’, referring to the wooden stick used to bless animals before their slaughter at traditional 
ceremonies.  A Tangalamena has religious and civil importance, acting as traditional religious leader 
and the chief arbitrator for a group of families, thus, asserting his authority over family heads (Dez 
1959).   
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cultural issue regarding authority and accountability.  Once leadership status has 
been achieved, the community accepts most decisions and actions without 
questioning accountability.  This inherent low expectation of accountability and 
transparency has transferred across to administrative leaders, such as mayors and 
présidents fokontany, resulting in a disconnect between local government officials 
and communities.  This practice fails to nurture a culture of good governance.   
In addition to ethnic bonding, communities demonstrated the ability to form 
associations to improve human capital. For instance, parents directly employing 
teachers in unstaffed rural state schools, offering boxes of rice as payment; and the 
women’s association established in town, although members and leaders were 
struggling to maintain enthusiasm and motivation.  In certain fokontany (parishes), 
villagers also formed specific farming associations to improve economic capital; such 
as cattle breeding and cattle security.  However, the authority of these grassroots 
associations remained within community boundaries; links to associations in other 
communities were not identified.   
Multi-ethnicity in Briéville commune is a likely factor behind the fragmentation of 
society observed in urban and rural fokontany (parishes).  Dialects and cultures are a 
common bond within fokon’olo (kinship groups), which can also sustain historical 
ethnic barriers, despite a cosmopolitan interaction with other ethnic groups.  
Influenced by the company’s nepotistic employment practices, ethnic groups were 
also somewhat compartmentalised in the work environment.  The broader rural 
community was similarly divisive, with a disconnect between ‘newcomer’ and 
indigenous villages, whereas relatively strong links existed within ‘newcomers’ of 
similar ethnic origin.  The isolation from their homeland enhanced solidarity within 
rural fokon’olo, but increased fragmentation in the broader rural community.  Ethnic 
solidarity was evident in situations where there were common issues, such as land 
disputes, since fokon’olo (kinship groups) would bond together to support its 
members in cross-ethnicity negotiations.  The outcome of these circumstances is a 
fragmented and weak grassroots society, effective suppression of opposition and 
low expectations of accountability which manifests as community voices remaining 
unheard.   
Key players and institutions in a business context 
A key objective of the union movement in Madagascar is the economic and social 
progress of its members.  Member and executive respondents from unions 
concurred that the movement’s primary aim is to improve workers’ social and 
economic rights, whilst safeguarding their employment through facilitating dialogue 
between workers, employers and the political administration.  However, union 
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executives alleged that the Government’s failure to monitor or enforce statutory 
compliance with employment law, inter alia, served to weaken their position.  They 
also expressed concern that the generally good dialogue between workers and 
management was not mirrored between union officials and government.  The union 
movement is also susceptible to external political influence, as observed in the 
transitional government’s influence on a union delegation from Kraoma.  At the time 
of this study, union members were actively seeking the resignation of the Director 
General (DG), who had been appointed by the previous government under 
Ravalomanana.31  After an unfruitful meeting with the DG, in Antananarivo, for 
formal negotiations, the delegation made contact with members of the new Haute 
Autorité de la Transition (High Transitional Authority: transitional government), who 
allegedly proposed the removal of the DG from post.32  Disappointed by their 
unsuccessful negotiations with the DG, frustrated by the large number of high 
salaried senior managers at Kraoma’s headquarters and fuelled by the recent 
political events, the delegation agreed to lobby for the DG’s removal.  This unilateral 
action by the delegation, without further consultation, created tension with some 
unions, depending on their political alliance.33  Nevertheless, unions within Kraoma 
represent a wide spectrum of views, opinions, ethnicities and political alliances, 
which are not suppressed by the political manipulation identified in local 
government.  Personal development is a key motivator behind union membership 
and the findings of this study suggest that external capacity-building initiatives are 
creating a culture with greater expectations of transparency and accountability.  It is 
noted, however, that union representation is limited to Kraoma workers and is not 
necessarily representative of wider society.  Furthermore, this strength cannot be 
applied to trans-national large-scale mining operations with high numbers of 
expatriate workers.  In these circumstances, any union representation would be 
allied to and recognised by the country of origin, thus, externalising the inherent and 
legitimate strength observed in unions in Kraoma.  
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 Former President Ravalomanana, ousted in 2009. 
32 Established in the 1940s France, Comités d’Entreprise (company social committees), comprising 
elected worker representatives, received a percentage of employee wages to spend, typically, on 
health and welfare initiatives or to provide child support to workers’ families (Bonin 2008).  In 21st 
century Madagascar, it is a forum comprising employee and management representatives with the 
remit to participate in, be consulted about and influence decisions regarding the company’s financial, 
operational and employment situation.   
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 Many unions have overt political alliances, often with ethnic allegiances. 
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The most powerful union institution within Kraoma is the Inter-Syndicat (inter-union 
meeting), which comprises three Délégués de Syndicaux (union representatives) 
from each of the six unions represented in the company.  Formal employee-
management consultation is conducted through the Assemblée des Délégués du 
Personnel (employee representatives’ meeting), which, in Kraoma, comprises union 
and management membership.34  Kraoma’s unions were frustrated by the 
company’s reluctance to establish a formal Comité d’Entreprise (company social 
committee).  Legally endorsed in 2007, in companies with more than 50 employees, 
employee representatives have the right to request this formal forum for employee 
and management representatives.35  Respondents described a Comité d’Entreprise 
(company social committee) as more substantial than an Assemblée des Délégués du 
Personnel (employee representatives’ meeting), extending beyond formal 
consultation to union engagement in decision-making on financial, operational and 
employment matters.  A union executive foresaw that, in the context of mining, the 
Comité d’Entreprise (company social committee) could examine a company’s 
accounts with a higher degree of transparency than other employee representative 
groups.  Unions’ positivity regarding these comités, however, is countered by 
employers’ negativity.  Some notable privatised companies had experienced 
considerable employee relations’ difficulties after the establishment of Comités 
d’Entreprise: JIRAMA (water utility), SIRAMA (sugar producer) and Air Madagascar 
(national airline).  At the time of this study, these companies were frequently 
experiencing negative publicity in the media, such as allegations of excessive salaries 
for their Chief Executives, many of whom are Westerners, or personal gain through 
corrupt means by Malagasy senior managers (Randrianasolo 2009).   
Despite limitations, such as fragmentation of support through union proliferation, 
the impact of political alliances and external manipulation, unions are the most 
notable strength within society in Briéville commune.  For instance, they exhibit the 
capacity to provide a platform within civil society where political opposition can be 
expressed and individuals can question the institutional structure in terms of 
accountability.  One powerful characteristic is the freedom to associate at the 
grassroots without any obvious direct external political influence.  Moreover, it is 
likely that the establishment of a Comité d’Entreprise (company social committee) in 
Kraoma would considerably enhance unions’ rights within the company.  In the 
context of the extractives industries, union involvement in the examination of a 
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 In non-unionised companies, the Assemblée de Délégués du Personnel would comprise employee 
representatives who are not union members. 
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 Comité d’Entreprise: translation taken from Bonin (2008: p. 10).  
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company’s accounts could improve transparency and accountability, conditions 
which proponents of the EITI believe will lead to good governance.  The Comité 
d’Entreprise (company social committee), however, falls under Malagasy labour law 
and would not apply to the two most advanced (in terms of project development) 
trans-national mining companies operating in Madagascar, Rio Tinto and Sherritt, 
which have a predominantly non-Malagasy workforce.   
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study set out to identify the challenges associated with community 
representation in stakeholder engagement initiatives, through an exploration of 
grassroots relationships around the location of an established parastatal mining 
company.  The aim was to examine the reality of the trend towards community 
engagement in decision-making processes as a means of improving accountability 
and transparency, in pursuit of achieving good governance in the extractives 
industries.  The findings suggest that the key influence on community representation 
in Briéville commune is the paternalistic relationships between Kraoma, local 
government and wider society.  In Briéville and Andriamena communes, the 
relationship between national and local government was characterised by political 
alliances arising out of electoral manipulation, which effectively suppressed 
community or political opposition.  Local government is also effectively 
overshadowed by Kraoma’s political and economic capital, in particular, the 
company’s parastatal status and the commune’s reliance on royalties.  As a 
consequence of this dominance, few opportunities for broad consultation have 
evolved and there are no multi-stakeholder forums for strategic planning.  In effect, 
local officials are heavily influenced by Kraoma; there is minimal focus on community 
involvement in the development of the town and even less focus on rural 
development.  Thus, community representation is heavily suppressed by a variety of 
factors including political, financial and social capital.  It is, however, acknowledged 
that Briéville town has developed beyond towns of similar size in other parts of the 
country. 
The paternalistic relationship between Kraoma and Briéville’s urban residents can be 
better understood by considering French industrial relations in the mid 20th century 
and Kraoma’s socialist roots in the mid-1970s.  COMINA, Kraoma’s French 
antecedent, almost certainly practiced racial paternalism in order to elicit a labour 
force, as well as broader paternalistic welfare institutions to attract Malagasy labour 
to under-populated Betsiboka Region (after Kelemen 2006).  The latter type of 
paternalism was common in 19th century France to encourage workers to relocate 
and settle in new areas.  Typically, French mining companies invested the equivalent 
of up to 10 per cent of employees’ wages in welfare provisions, such as housing, 
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schools, churches, shops and medical care, as well as pension plans (Bonin 2008; 
Reid 1985).  In Madagascar in the 1960s, COMINA’s motivation was almost certainly 
to overcome the acute labour shortage and to provide suitable welfare facilities for 
the company’s expatriate managers and families.  After the departure of expatriates 
when the company was nationalised in 1975 during the socialist era, Kraoma 
maintained the welfare culture to support its Malagasy workforce, embracing the 
five key social commitments adopted by French companies exhibiting paternalism: 
positive in-migration to under-populated areas, pension schemes, welfare provision, 
social housing and leisure facilities.   
In the 19th century, French industrial paternalism evolved beyond philanthropy as 
large firms adopted a series of techniques to create and manipulate the hierarchical 
relations within the management framework (Reid 1985).  This mechanism of 
persuasion and repression to control the workforce created a culture of dependency; 
moreover, to protect the “insularity of their communities”, companies also 
manipulated local government through overt support for political candidates 
employed by, or sympathetic to, the company (ibid: p. 585).  In France’s nationalised 
mining industry, companies also cited paternalistic benefits as a defence against 
state interference in the allocation of mineral concessions, the argument being that 
the impact of their welfare provisions on workers outweighed the potential benefits 
of returning control of mineral deposits to local communities.  Furthermore, 
companies attempted to retain control over workers through restricting contact with 
external influences.  They established shops with affordable goods that undercut 
local businesses perceived to be exercising political influence over workers.  
Foremen were denied the right to establish retail businesses; the companies argued 
that they needed to control the expenditure of workers, on moral grounds (Reid 
1985).  Although retail spending was not limited or controlled by Kraoma, no Kraoma 
managers operated any subsidiary businesses in Briéville.  It was not established 
whether this was by individual choice or in accordance with company policy.   
The concept of industrial paternalism is also noted for gender distinctions, which 
initially succeeded in removing women and children from the workplace, before 
undergoing a U-turn and positively attracting women back to employment.  Some 
companies in the United States subsequently adopted a social nurturing role, 
positively grooming ‘factory girls’ into ‘prospective wives’ for its male employees 
(Tone 1997).  Kraoma has not proactively pursued any of these strategies; yet, its 
nepotistic employment practices virtually exclude women from the workplace and 
restrict the locations and ethnic groups from which employees are recruited.  
Sharma (2009) found a similar patriarchal culture and gender inequalities in mining 
towns in Australia where few employment opportunities exist for women and male 
workers preferred to spend leisure time with workmates, often involving alcohol 
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consumption.  Such behaviour further marginalised women, strained marital 
relationships and could affect the social and emotional health of the children.  
Bonin (2008) suggests a range of conditions that occurred in the 1940s, during 
France’s socialist period, which curtailed the evolution of paternalism into CSR, 
despite common roots in welfare.  Firstly, reliance on company welfare diminished 
as France developed state welfare institutions.  Moreover, companies lost their 
influential allies when centralisation of public administration disempowered local 
government.  Additionally, in a stance designed to confront communist unions’ 
ethos, socialist trade unions directly opposed company patronage and control over 
social development.  The statutory role of unions in company welfare also displaced 
company paternalism through the establishment of Comités d’Entreprise (company 
social committees), which required companies to commit a percentage of the payroll 
into a welfare fund controlled by those comités comprising elected employee 
representatives.  Kraoma exhibits many of the characteristics of industrial 
paternalism and revealed no enthusiasm for embracing the Western notion of CSR 
that, typically, extends beyond the tangible boundaries of responsibilities towards 
employees.  However, external pressure and reforms to develop paternalism into 
broader welfare and social initiatives, as experienced in France, are not prevalent in 
Madagascar.  There is no welfare state provision; the role of unions in socio-
economic development is under-developed due to a lack of resources; and, through 
poor relations with government agencies, the unions have minimal strategic 
influence.  Thus, without significant external influence, Kraoma’s paternalism is 
unlikely to formally extend beyond the tangible boundaries of responsibilities 
towards employees and ad hoc pastoral care.  Moreover, the findings suggest that 
the paternalistic culture inhibits community involvement in matters which could 
improve social cohesion or improve the social capital of the community. 
Before considering the potential value of union engagement as stakeholders in the 
EITI process, a global perspective of the influence of the union movement in Africa is 
offered, followed by an exploration of the potential challenges to unions in 
developing countries, in the context of the findings of this study.  Unions are 
considered a relatively late development in the social history of Africa, appearing in 
the 1920s in British colonies and a decade later in French colonial Madagascar 
(Bureau for Workers' Activities of ILO (ACTRAV-ILO) 2010; Dibben and Nadin 2011).  
Although union history varies according to former colonial power, post-
independence political history and the economic strength of the country, colonial 
powers generally supported unions, considering them a means to achieving social 
peace (Henderson 1973).  For unions in Francophone Africa, the Brazzaville 
Conference in 1944 achieved the most significant advancement in terms of social 
and welfare provision.  Although countries were still under colonial control, the 
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outcomes of the conference led to greater African empowerment in politics: the 
freedom to create local associations, as well as negotiating more acceptable working 
conditions and welfare benefits (Bureau for Workers' Activities of ILO (ACTRAV-ILO) 
2010).  The following decade, prior to the move to independence for many 
francophone nations, labour law was revised to permit the establishment of unions 
that were independent from French parent organisations.  Efforts were also made to 
establish cross-border confederations of African unions, but these failed due to 
political pressures during the pre-independence period.  In the 1950s and 1960s, the 
union movement played a major role in improving social conditions for workers in 
Africa, as well as supporting the move for national independence.  Solidarity and 
unity are considered the fundamental strengths that enabled unions to fight for 
social justice and democracy during the colonial era, as well as supporting the 
struggle for independence.  The key question is whether these characteristics, which 
could be valuable in terms of consolidating union representation, prevail in the 
current union movement in Madagascar or other resource-rich developing 
countries?   
Some of the limitations identified in relationships between unions and Kraoma 
correspond with challenges faced by European unions in the late twentieth century.  
In the 1960s and early 1970s in Europe, union activity was characterised by militant 
industrial conflicts, often resulting in strike action for improved pay and conditions.  
By the late 1970s, collective mobilisation had declined, as had the economy in 
Europe.  Strengthened by former successes, unions gained an enhanced role in 
determining economic policies with employers and some governments, a period 
known as “neo-corporatism” (Regini 1992: p. 1-16).  Conversely, during this period of 
union strength in Europe, post-independent African nations sidelined unions or 
incorporated them as agencies of government.  The integration of unions into 
government was further consolidated during the socialist era experienced by many 
African nations, including Madagascar (Bureau for Workers' Activities of ILO 
(ACTRAV-ILO) 2010; Dibben and Nadin 2011).  Although structural adjustment 
programmes strengthened labour laws in Africa, they are broadly thought to have 
eroded union membership, inter alia, through the reduction in formal employment 
opportunities (Thomas 1995).  In mid-1980s Europe, unions responded to the 
changing political and industrial conditions by developing greater flexibility.  
Relationships between unions and management evolved to respond to the 
diversification of labour, which required individual solutions rather than the 
aggregated approach of previous eras.  In the 1990s, the union movement in Africa 
regained limited independence through the emergence of more democratic political 
regimes in Africa, although many governments continued to undermine unions’ 
rights and freedoms.  One significant difference appeared between union 
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movements in Francophone Africa and those in English-speaking countries: trade 
union pluralism was fully reinstated in the former, whereas the latter retained a 
centralised system.   
Pluralism, however, has a distinct negative impact on the solidarity and unity, 
characteristics previously considered critical to consolidating the strength of the 
union movement.  The proliferation of unions, which has evolved under the right to 
pluralism, is considered one of the most serious challenges to the trade union 
movement in Francophone Africa (Bureau for Workers' Activities of ILO (ACTRAV-
ILO) 2010).  Pluralism, which was introduced to provide a safeguard for the 
independence of unions has, in effect, enabled the proliferation of unions and 
facilitated political alliances between unions and political actors.  This can lead to 
loss of union independence and freedom.  Although politicisation can provide 
support for progressing certain union demands through government, it can also 
result in loss of authority and autonomy (Valenzuela 1992).  Pluralism can create the 
very circumstances it aims to overcome - a case in point being the Democratic 
Republic of Congo which has 420 unions, mostly emanating from self interest and 
political ambition rather than true pluralism.  Proliferation is not the only problem.  A 
lack of unity and solidarity are other significant issues.  For instance, Mali has only 
two national union centres, but they refuse to collaborate (Bureau for Workers' 
Activities of ILO (ACTRAV-ILO) 2010).  Despite the drawbacks associated with 
pluralism, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) asserts that workers must 
have the freedom to join the union they believe will best defend their interests.  It 
also cautions that nations must not return to the one political party-one union 
position of the socialist era.  This study identified that pluralism and the associated 
politicisation of individual unions restricted solidarity, which impacted on the 
capacity for the movement to act as a cohesive body of opinion and opposition.   
The capacity for Malagasy union voices to be heard is further limited by lack of 
recognition, suppression and manipulation by senior government officials.  The 
union movement in Madagascar is considered weak for many of the reasons already 
highlighted: poor organisation, continuing political obstruction and, in multi-sector 
bodies, the political manipulation of worker representatives (2005; Fleischmann 
2009; ITUC 2008).  Despite the Government’s ratification of international labour law, 
unions complained to the ILO about repression of their rights, namely, the 
Government’s manipulation of elections for employee representatives and the lack 
of proper consultation prior to the restructuring of the Board overseeing the Caisse 
Nationale de Prévoyance Sociale (CNaPS: National Social Security Fund) 
(International Labour Office 2002).  In 2008, the International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC) stated that Malagasy legislation hinders the right to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, as well as inhibiting the rights of ‘essential’ 
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public employees to strike (ITUC 2008).  More recently, unions lobbied against 
employers’ organisations and the government in a vain attempt to save thousands of 
jobs in the textile manufacturing sector threatened by international economic 
sanctions following the political crisis.  This lack of success and the resulting massive 
unemployment almost caused the union movement to collapse.  After an initial 
surge of solidarity in 2009, the unions remained virtually silent in 2010, before 
picking up momentum in 2011 with wage bargaining talks (Andrianasy and Groeger 
2011). 
As already established, several potentially negative impacts of pluralism, such as 
proliferation and politicisation, were identified within union dynamics in Kraoma.  
For instance, the presence of six unions in a company of less than 400 employees, 
with approximately 50 per cent union membership, provides very few members in 
the smaller unions.  Furthermore, although union activism at the time of this study 
may undermine members’ efforts to substantiate union political neutrality and intra-
union solidarity, it also demonstrates the freedom to express opposing views and 
politics in a relatively open manner.   
The challenges associated with community representation in stakeholder 
engagement initiatives are influenced by dependencies and nepotism that pervade 
all institutional levels.  Thus, the action and behaviour of civil society stakeholder 
representatives may be unrepresentative of the society they are intended to 
represent.  Similarly, the lack of horizontal and vertical trust and reciprocity inherent 
in Malagasy society engenders a culture of low expectations regarding transparency 
and accountability, which further enables a cycle of nepotism and elite rent-seeking 
behaviour (after Uphoff 1986; Ostrom 1990; Snidal 1995; Grix 2001; Andriamalala 
and Gardner 2010).  These circumstances are further facilitated by the state’s low 
dependence on citizen taxation, which reduces society’s ability to bargain with the 
State to demand the political change or financial transparency that could eliminate 
rent-seeking behaviour and elicit more equitable distribution of benefits (after 
Brousseau et al. 2010; Stevens and Dietsche 2008).  These societal norms do not 
progress the purpose or intended outcomes of the EITI, in terms of seeking 
transparency and accountability.  Unions are a notable exception, with a statutory 
right to collective bargaining in terms of determining employment conditions.  
Importantly, unions within Kraoma are now questioning the company’s lack of 
transparency and are demanding their legal right to engage in the company’s 
financial and operational decision-making processes.  In a country which has 
experienced numerous political scandals, election irregularities, corruption and 
violent civil unrest (Ploch, 2009; Randrianja, 2003), this action is a small, but positive, 
step towards improved governance in one (parastatal) mining company. 
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However, as illustrated by Madagascar’s history of political coups (Randrianja 2003), 
the institutional framework in Madagascar conforms to that of a despotic state, 
whereby groups of elites engage in rent-seeking behaviour until challenged by 
another group of elites appropriating fewer benefits (after Brousseau et al. 2010; 
Randrianja 2003).  Brousseau et al. (2010) suggest that the process of political 
development, which includes good governance, relies on two fundamental 
interrelated dynamics: i) the rule of law, which leads to equalisation of rights; and ii) 
a capable and impartial state.  The authors offer the model of ‘constitutionalisation’ 
to describe the process of ongoing vertical interaction, that is, bargaining between 
heterogeneous groups of citizens, market agents and the ruling elite in order to 
achieve more equitable rights.  The institutional analysis within this paper identified 
top-level domination and manipulation across several scales.  In few instances was 
bargaining a component of interactions or negotiations, although, in the union 
movement, external expression of discontent and the drive to improve social capital 
was becoming more apparent.  Traditional respect and low expectations of 
accountability in leaders had also transposed several scales, from grassroots kin-
based elitism to the State and Presidency.  Malagasy citizens delegated authority to 
leaders, despite their questionable legitimacy created by manipulated constitutional 
processes and the absence of a ‘fair’ return in terms of public services or equality of 
opportunity.  On the other hand, leaders retained power with minimal vertical 
delegation or decentralisation of authority among levels of government and directed 
opportunities towards the elite, often based on personal ties, thus, perpetuating 
rent-seeking behaviour within the privileged minority.   
To conclude, any initiative to promote transparency and accountability, such as a 
consultative framework, needs to acknowledge and be more responsive to power 
imbalances and politics at the local level.  These conditions can be better understood 
through improved communication with community representatives who are more 
equitably selected to accurately reflect the broad range of community opinion.  
Although pressure from civil society is considered one of the strongest catalysts for 
institutional reform in resource-rich states, the manipulation of stakeholders in 
rentier states works against the principles of stakeholder engagement.  Rentier 
states, which derive considerable revenue from non-renewable resources, typically 
suppress political and institutional reform in order to maintain the conditions of low 
accountability and lack of transparency that foster rent-seeking behaviour.  As a way 
forward, the process of stakeholder engagement requires a more discerning 
approach to identifying stakeholders, who can genuinely represent communities 
with authority, beyond and outside the upward hierarchy of dependency that has 
been identified within this study. 
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